We responded to questions from Jahan-e Emrouz (World Today), the Persian-language newspaper of the Iranian Communist Party, regarding Öcalan’s message of “Reconciliation and a democratic society,” the dissolution of the PKK, and the Imrali talks.[1]
1. After various meetings between the “DEM Party” and Abdullah Ocalan, and the talks of these delegations with political parties in Turkey, and the delegations’ trips to Qandil and meetings with the leaders of the ruling parties in Iraqi Kurdistan, Abdullah Ocalan’s message of “Reconciliation and a Democratic Society” was finally published from prison. How do you see the objective grounds for the publication of this message?
As a movement, we believe that the class and domination character of the Republic of Turkey has been clear since the states founding: a buffer zone against the expansion of the Soviets, and an advanced outpost for the exploitation and reorganization of the Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans, and the Caucasus; a colonial country. However, of course, there are analyses that assume the state of republic of Turkey(It will be called as TR state) acts independently from imperialism and hegemonic institutions such as NATO.
This perspective, which also finds support within parts of the left, argues that there exists a supposed contradiction between Turkey and Israel that could even lead to war, and that this “contradiction” is pushing the TR state toward peace with the Kurds.
Another interpretation suggests that the TR state is trying to resolve its internal problems domestically. Yet, the very nature of the Kurdish question—spread across four countries—reveals its inherently international character.
Moreover, we believe that no issue discussed in the region can be considered independent of the ongoing and expanding war (which, in our view, is becoming increasingly globalized and taking on the character of an imperialist war of redivision—essentially a form of world war). The imperialist powers’ stance and repeated intervention that has become a pattern toward armed resistance groups in the region cannot be ignored.
In this sense, we believe that these developments are not independent from the growing, explicit, and potentially all-out war directed against Iran and the “Axis of Resistance,” unless these forces fully submit to imperialism and the United States.
Additionally, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which serves as the “spokesperson” of this “process,” is one of the internal war organizations originally organized by NATO against communism. Therefore, it cannot be expected to adopt a position independent from NATO nationalism.
In summary, the vaguely defined “terror-free Turkey” or “peace and democratic society process” is not primarily the result of the Turkish state’s own initiative or desire, but rather of steps attempted in order to realize the U.S. and imperialism’s plans for the region’s redesign. There is no guarantee whatsoever that this will lead to any conclusive outcome.
2. Nearly twenty months have passed since Öcalan’s message. During this time, the Erdogan government has continued its repression and pan-Turkist and neo-Ottoman policies against the Kurdish people in Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan, and the self-governing regions and the Syrian Democratic Forces. How do you see this response from the Turkish government?
The Turkish Republic has never changed this policy—neither under its current government nor at any point in its history.
This state was not only founded as a forward outpost based on anti-communism and denial of class structures; it was also built upon the annihilation and denial of peoples. It was erected as a tombstone over what was once a mosaic-like garden of peoples.
If this was not fully accomplished, the credit belongs to the persistence of resistance. The Kurdish revolution is one of the most significant powers of that resistance and, for a long time, one of the key forces that unraveled the TR state. In this sense, the state’s war against the Kurds is not merely a policy—it stems from its very roots.
This genetic structure of the state has not changed, and it certainly cannot be altered through reforms. The recognition of the Kurdish people as a nation is entirely out of the question. Under current conditions, at the best, the state might attempt to end the Kurdish revolution through partial concessions.
Therefore, we are not surprised by the ongoing attacks against the Kurds despite the so-called “process.” As we mentioned above, for the TR state, the issue is about aligning with imperialism’s plan to reshape the region by liquidating all resistance dynamics, including the Kurdish revolutionary movement. Hence, one should harbor no illusions that “while the process is ongoing,” new massacres are not being planned.
Regarding the question of the state’s pan-Turkist or neo-Ottomanist orientation: of course, there are groups within the ruling class and the state that try to shape ideology along these lines. Yet, since its establishment, the TR has never departed from its line of dependency on imperialism. These ideological tendencies are only amplified when they serve a useful function. Beyond that, the entire Turkish bourgeoisie is deeply tied to imperialism. What they call “historical interests” are now those of the United States; what they call “national interests” are those of Europe.
From this perspective, even claiming that Turkey currently follows a pan-Turkist, neo-Ottomanist, or nationalist line may be an exaggeration.
Nevertheless, the combined use of Turkism, Ottomanism, and Islamism is itself part of this state’s history. Today, this political framework functions in service of imperialism.
3. Do you really think that the Turkish government has the slightest motivation or approach to a peaceful and democratic solution to the Kurdish issue? If they were serious, they should have released Ocalan, Demirtaş, and all political prisoners as a gesture of good will in the first place.
We believe this question has already been partially answered in the previous sections. Although there are currently discussions about Demirtaş’s potential release, this does not change our view.
In addition, certain developments in Syria—particularly between the SDF and HTS under U.S. coordination—may influence the course of these negotiations in Turkey.
However, the words “peaceful” and “democratic” unfortunately do not adequately describe the current reality.
4. Given this policy of the Erdogan government, can we say that Öcalan’s message, the decree to disarm and dissolve the PKK, means nothing else but unconditional surrender?
Although the revolutionary struggle in Kurdistan and in Anatolia are deeply intertwined, we view our relationship with the Kurdish revolution and its vanguard as one of internationalist solidarity.
In this sense, different country’s struggles may experience distinct dynamics. Of course, we consider every gain of the Kurdish revolution as a gain for the peoples of the region as a whole. Even when we find certain directions or decisions mistaken, we cannot disregard the colorful and creative history of the Kurdish struggle. Therefore, we see the current developments as part of the Kurdish revolution’s ongoing and uneven path forward—progressing through ups and downs.
We hope the Kurdish revolutionaries’ struggle will continue to advance through victories. Our criticisms, therefore, are those of friends toward friends.
The regional dynamics and the existential threats imposed on the Kurdish people are far from simple. The destruction of Gaza is also a threat directed at the Kurds. This situation may be pressuring the revolutionary tendency within the heterogeneous structure of the Kurdish movement against the reformist tendency.
Indeed, the PKK and, more broadly, the Kurdish movement sometimes take steps that we do not fully understand or expect. This reflects both the actions of its leadership—whether we view them as right or wrong—and the structural impasse faced by regional revolutionary forces that are unable to open new fronts or generate new revolutionary breakthroughs.
For this reason, labeling this move as “unconditional surrender” would be premature and would show a lack of respect for the immense sacrifices of our Kurdish comrades.
5. In the past few days, the PKK announced that it would withdraw its military forces from Turkey. After the symbolic burning of weapons in Qandil, this is the second action by the PKK in line with its policy in the military field. However, so far there has been no political change on the side of the Turkish government. So how do you see the fate of Öcalan’s message?
These developments demonstrate the seriousness with which the Kurdistan Workers’ Party has embraced the initiative launched by its imprisoned leader. Now, there is significant public expectation that the “process” will be formalized with legal guarantees—such as the release of political prisoners and the termination of trustee (kayyum) appointments.
On the other hand, considering the increasing repression against the entire opposition and even the violent suppression of basic acts of protest, it seems highly unlikely—under even the most optimistic lens—that such expectations will be fulfilled.
Despite all this, while we recognize the Kurdish people’s gains as genuine achievements, we unfortunately cannot foresee a clear or bright future at this stage.
6. Given the PKK’s experience, how do you see the solution to eliminating national oppression against Kurds and its relationship to the nationwide class struggle?
To start with general principles:
– Without socialism, that is, without social liberation, there can be no national liberation.
– In Kurdistan, the struggles for national liberation and socialism are intertwined. The working class and the poor, especially the peasantry, form the main base of the revolution. Therefore, the defeat of the revolution would mean the revolutionary vanguard and its base—workers and poor peasants—abandoning socialism.
– The Kurdish revolution has already begun to solve the national question by bringing a people into existence and mobilizing them. From this point forward, the struggle will be between a conciliatory line that seeks formal recognition through compromise, and a revolutionary line that continues to advance social liberation and socialism.
Looking at the current situation: national oppression over the Kurds has become the dominant contradiction obscuring the fundamental contradiction between labor and capital.
Despite decades of exploitation, occupation, and the depth and diversity of the national liberation struggle, the situation, at its core, remains simple: the call for the world’s workers to unite is the call for the working class to break its chains.
Thus, the Kurdish people’s achievement of their national rights (including, if they so choose, the right to separation) would contribute to the united struggle of the Kurdish and Anatolian working classes and to the expansion of the socialist front in the region—ultimately advancing the regional revolution.
The Kurdish revolution has, until now, found its own solutions through its own development. Today, it faces perhaps its greatest test. We have countless criticisms regarding this. We see no “positive” outlook in either the negotiations with the state or the general direction of the “process.”
Up to this point, we have spoken specifically about the current “process.” We are not addressing Öcalan’s theories of “democratic society” and “communalism,” which he claims to have built as a critique of Marxism. We see no theoretical or scientific connection between these concepts and Marxism, and we question why there was even a need to introduce so called “1“new theses” through a critique of Marxism.
Nonetheless, given the Kurdish people’s militant history and their enduring contribution to the regional revolutionary process, we believe that—even if it requires major upheavals—they will once again produce their own solution from within.
[1]* Questions were answered as of November 8, 2025.
